For those that would use the lack thereof pain receptors as the primary mechanism to distinguish penguins and dogs from lobsters, this argument is both invalid and incorrect.
More importantly, Wallace points out that lobsters seem to meet the two criteria that ethicists use to determine whether an animal is capable of suffering: 1 the amount of pain receptors that the animal in question has, and 2 whether the animal displays the behavior associated with pain.
Essay Consider the Lobster, by David Foster Wallace - Animal's rights is the idea that some, or all, nonhuman animals are entitled to the possession of their own lives, and that their most basic interests, such as an interest in not suffering, should be afforded the same consideration as the similar interests of human beings.
However, Wallace emphasizes that no amount of lobster paraphernalia and clever marketing strategies can divert him from the serious question, "Is it right to boil a sentient creature alive just for our gustatory pleasure?
He then returned to the cave to spread the knowledge he gained, but his peers rejected him and refused to listen It is, in lines and gridlock and transaction after transaction, to confront a dimension of yourself that is as inescapable as it is painful: As a tourist, you become economically significant but existentially loathsome, an insect on a dead thing.
For example, he calls attention to promotional material provided by the MLF which describes the lobster's nervous system as simple, decentralized, and lacking the structures which resist pain—an explanation which Wallace then rejects as "incorrect in about nine different ways" How wrong I was to postpone for so long!